Rift and prior support no bar to provision for child left out of will

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Edward Natale died in Perth in August 2018, leaving an estate of $575,000.

His will, made in May 2017, left everything to his de facto partner of over 20 years, Terrase Brown but made no provision for his daughter from his earlier marriage.

The daughter, Marrisa, then aged 29 promptly filed proceedings seeking orders that adequate provision be made for her maintenance, support, and advancement.

Marrisa’s relationship with her father had fractured and they were fully estranged by 2015.  

Edward made this clear to his lawyer Camillo D’Angelo that – in his mind – she lacked respect for him. He also informed his accountant Salvatore Vallelonga, she should receive no provision as he had already provided for Marrisa’s mother on their divorce.

When the contest came before Justice Michael Gething in the Western Australia Supreme Court, Marrisa argued for $800,000.00 from the estate.

She swore as to her minimal assets, significant liabilities and health challenges that limited her capacity to earn income but conceded she had received $300,000 from the deceased over the 10 years prior to their estrangement.

She also contended her father’s business assets had been improperly diverted out of his estate, an allegation that was dismissed and one that in any case, could not be brought in a family provision claim as it was a separate claim involving Justin – the deceased’s son from his subsequent relationship – for whom the will also had made no provision.

Terrase – the sole beneficiary aged 66 yrs – swore she had been integral to building the family wealth, playing an active role in the couple’s financial success over decades. She had weekly part-time after tax earnings of around $1,000 and $445,000 in superannuation.

His Honour accepted Marrisa had demonstrated genuine financial hardship but noted – at age 36 as at the date of the trial – she had time to improve her financial position and had not contributed to the business or the estate in any way.

He observed Edward’s earlier “generous” assistance in the context of the modest profitability of his business, the high debt secured over his family home, and the modest size of the estate.

In  his view this substantially satisfied the expectation that that parents will give children some “start in life” and a buffer against misfortune.​

He noted too that the “mere fact of estrangement” does not of itself prevent an adult child from satisfying the threshold requirement of inadequate provision but it reduced how much a “just and wise” testator might have left her. 

He concluded that in these particular circumstances, the unresolved estrangement did not justify excluding her entirely in the face of her significant need.​

Overall, His Honour described Marrisa’s moral claim as warranted but weak.

Terrase on the other hand had contributed significantly to building the estate, was now in modest financial circumstances, and had legitimate expectations based on their 20-year relationship.

Had Edward died without a will, the law would have given Terrase the entire estate.

Her long-term partnership and contribution to the family’s wealth created a moral entitlement that the court weighed as superior to Marrisa’s claim.

In the judge’s view a “just and wise” testator would have done exactly what Edward did—provided the substantial matrimonial home to his de facto spouse—but would also have made provision for his daughter.

He ordered that provision should be made for Marrisa to the extent of $100,000.00. 

Justin – the deceased’s son – was named in the will as the sole beneficiary were Terrase to have pre-deceased Edward. He did not claim any family provision entitlement in this instance but presumably he will be the ultimate beneficiary of Terrase’s estate.

Natale v Brown as Executor of the Estate of Edward Natale [2025] WASC 492